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Abstract 
 
Motivated by Japan's economic experiences and policy debates over the past two 
decades, this paper uses an open economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model 
to examine the volatility and welfare impact of alternative monetary policies.  To capture 
the dynamic effects of likely structural breaks in the Japanese economy, we model 
agents’ expectation formation process with an adaptive learning framework, and compare 
four Taylor-styled policy rules that reflect concerns commonly raised in Japan's actual 
monetary policy debate.  We first show that imperfect knowledge and the associated 
learning process induce higher volatility in the economy, while retaining some of the 
policy conclusions from rational-expectations setups.  In particular, explicit exchange rate 
stabilization is unwarranted, and under volatile foreign disturbances, policymakers should 
consider targeting domestic price inflation rather than consumer price inflation.   
However, contrary to results based on rational expectations, we show that even though 
highly inflation-sensitive rules do raise output volatility, they may nevertheless improve 
overall welfare in an adaptive learning setting by smoothing inflation fluctuations.  Our 
findings suggest that previous policy conclusions that are based on partial equilibrium 
analyses, or that ignore likely deviations from rational expectations, may not be robust. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The Japanese economy and its dramatic turns during the last two decades have generated 
fervent research interests, ranging from the liquidity traps, to the appropriate monetary 
and fiscal responses, to the structural dynamics of the underlying economy.
1  On the 
empirical front, several papers point out that contrary to the experiences of other major 
OECD economies since the 1980s, Japan did not undergo a “great moderation” in the 
cyclical volatility of its economic activity; rather, it may have switched from a moderate 
growth-low volatility regime to a low growth-high volatility regime.
2  What can account 
for these empirical patterns?  Some researchers attribute the volatility to policy mistakes, 
arguing in particular that more desirable economic performance could have been 
achieved had the Bank of Japan (BOJ) adopted a looser inflation policy stance.  Concerns 
have also been raised as to whether it was prudent for the BOJ to engage in exchange rate 
stabilization rather than focusing solely on output and inflation targeting.   
Motivated by these discussions, this paper aims to conduct a systematic evaluation of 
the volatility and welfare consequences of alternative monetary policy choices, using a 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with explicit micro-foundations 
and welfare measures.  While our goal is not to explicitly model the Japanese economy 
and all of its intricacies, we introduce an additional element – adaptive learning – into our 
standard open economy model.  We argue that the stock market and real estate bubbles, 
along with their subsequent bursts, represent important structural shifts in the Japanese 
economy over this period, and under these unusual circumstances, the public’s 
expectations of how the economy would evolve may not converge immediately to the 
rational expectation outcome, as standard models assume.
3  The expectation-formation 
process may further interact with monetary policy actions to influence macroeconomic 
dynamics, even alter the desirability of various policy options.
4   In other words, standard 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Krugman et al. (1998), Kuttner and Posen (2001), McCallum (2003), and Svensson 
(2003a). 
2 Over the past two decades, Japan’s real GDP growth rates and its GDP per-capita growth both exhibit 
higher volatility than is observed in other industrialized countries, as shown in Table 1.1, and for example, 
Bernanke (2004), Stock and Watson (2005), Summers (2005), and Yu (2005).   
3 For example, Orphanides and Williams (2007 a,b) discuss how a constant gain learning framework can 
reflect public agents’ concern over potential structural shifts in the economy. 
4 Here we are not referring to the excess volatility associated with the indeterminacy of equilibria as 
discussed in Bernanke and Woodford (1997), Bullard and Mitra (2002), and others.  We consider only   3
policy conclusions from rational expectation models may not always be appropriate when 
agents’ expectations are knocked out of equilibrium by exogenous events such as 
structural breaks.  To model such dynamics and study its implications, we assume 
exogenous small deviations from rational expectations and employ the adaptive learning 
framework developed by Evans and Honkapohja (hereafter EH, 2001).
5  In this setup, 
private agents are bounded rational and have only partial information: they know the 
functional form but not the associated parameter values for the equations that govern the 
dynamics of the economy.  As such, they rely on past data and a recursive learning 
algorithm – least squares or constant gain learning – to form their forecasts and make 
consumption and production decisions.
6  They update their beliefs regarding the unknown 
parameters over time as new data become available.   
Introducing explicit welfare evaluations and adaptive learning, this paper examines 
the volatility and welfare impact of alternative monetary policy rules.  Our aim is to see 
whether the public's expectation-formation process, interacting with monetary policy 
choices, can induce excess volatility in the benchmark economy and/or alter the preferred 
policy action.
7  To allow for explicit welfare calculations, we adopt a standard micro-
founded New Keynesian open economy model, as in Gali and Monacelli (hereafter GM, 
2005), and study the dynamics of the economy under both rational expectations and 
adaptive learning.
8  To close the model, we envision the monetary authority to follow 
variants of the “operational” Taylor interest rate rule (McCallum and Nelson 1999, 2004), 
and adjust the short-term nominal interest rate linearly in response to deviations of the 
observed data from their target levels.
9   We consider four monetary policy rules that 
                                                                                                                                                 
learnable or expectationally stable equilibria in this paper, which means that economic agents can 
coordinate to reach them. 
5 We choose the adaptive learning setup for its relative ease of implementation as well as certain technical 
advantages over alternative methods.  For a detailed discussion, we refer interested readers to EH (2001).  
6 Specifically, agents estimate the parameters in the reduced-form equilibrium laws of motions for the 
economy.  See Section 4 for more details. 
7 We emphasize that deviations from rational expectation and the learning behavior are especially well-
justified when the economy is experiencing parameter instabilities or has undergone structural shifts. 
8 We follow the previous literature, e.g., McCallum (2003) and McCallum and Nelson (2000), in applying a 
small open economy model to analyze the Japanese monetary policy.  In addition, we note that the goal of 
this paper is not to provide a realistic model for the Japanese economy specifically; rather, our research 
questions are motivated by the Japanese experience.  
9 We assume the monetary authority can commit to a simple operational rule, and abstract away from 
discretionary optimal monetary policy considerations.  In addition, since the monetary rule is based on 
observable data, our model does not assume any information asymmetry between the public and the central   4
encapsulate the major points raised in the discussions concerning Japan's recent monetary 
policy actions.   The first rule, which we treat as a benchmark, is a Taylor rule with the 
standard weights of 1.5 and 0.5 on lagged inflation and output gap deviations 
respectively.  The second policy rule, capturing “the tighter rule” commonly discussed, is 
more aggressive on inflation control.  The third rule captures exchange rate stabilization 
motives and targets the terms of trade in addition.  Lastly, motivated by parallel 
discussions in the rational expectations-based monetary policy literature, we consider a 
rule that targets domestic producer price (DPP) inflation instead of CPI inflation.
10  For 
each of these rules, we examine how the volatilities of output and inflation differ, and 
then use a second-order approximation of the representative consumer’s utility function 
to compute the welfare losses under rational expectations, least squares learning, and 
constant gain learning.
11 
Our simulation results show that first of all, the learning process introduces excess 
volatility in the economy, leading to significant increases in the variances of both output 
and inflation from the rational expectation results.  This finding suggests that the 
volatility impact of structural shifts in an economy may be amplified by the uncertainty 
and learning dynamics they generate, as agents can only revise expectation errors over 
time.  This offers another potential explanation for the aforementioned empirical patterns 
observed in Japan.  Second, even though tighter inflation control can lead to excess 
output volatility as a trade-off, in a learning environment, it may dampen inflation 
volatility significantly, thus improve overall welfare.  This finding shows that it may not 
be prudent to judge policy rules against the same optimal benchmark when agents’ 
expectations may be deviating from the rational expectations equilibrium, such as right 
after major structural shifts.  Lastly, we show that rules that depend on the terms of trade, 
either explicitly or through a CPI target, generate substantially higher welfare loss than 
rules that focus on DPP inflation.  Especially when an economy is subject to persistent 
                                                                                                                                                 
bank.  Note also that under operational rules,  the central bank does not need to engage in any learning 
behavior. 
10 See Aoki (2001) and Woodford (2003), among others.  
11 The expected welfare loss of a policy rule that deviates from the optimal first-best policy can be 
approximated by a weighted sum of the variances of domestic producer price inflation and the domestic 
output gap.  See Woodford (2003), GM (2005), and Section 3.2 for further discussions.   5
and volatile foreign shocks, stabilizing DPP inflation dominates CPI inflation targeting 
under both rational expectations and adaptive learning.
12 
While our simple model is too stylized to capture the richness of Japan’s actual 
economy, our findings, based on a structural general equilibrium model with a welfare-
theoretic loss function, support some of the views raised in the literature; namely, the 
high output volatility observed may be the result of an overly restrictive monetary policy 
and engagement in exchange rate stabilization.  However, we note that despite raising 
output volatility, tighter inflation control may nevertheless improve overall welfare when 
agents have imperfect knowledge, and the optimal rule derived from rational expectation 
models may no longer apply. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 reviews recent literature on 
Japan’s monetary policy and motivates the policy rules we choose to evaluate.  Section 3 
presents the open economy general equilibrium model and specifies the four monetary 
policy rules.  Section 4 discusses the equilibrium concepts and solution methodology for 
rational expectations and adaptive learning.  Section 5 describes the calibration and 
simulation procedures and presents our findings.  Section 6 concludes. 
   
2. Monetary Policy in Japan 
 
The economic bubble Japan experienced in the 1980s and the economy’s ensuing 
downturn have stimulated extensive research and discussions.  While problems with the 
banking sector, corporate structure, and excessive speculative behavior are all major 
contributing factors, this paper draws specifically from two debates concerning the Bank 
of Japan’s monetary policy stance during this period.  The first questions whether the 
BOJ should have adopted a lower interest rate, and the second asks whether exchange 
rate stabilization was prudent.   
A common criticism of BOJ’s policy is that it was overly restrictive, arguing that a 
lower interest rate on several occasions, both pre- and post-collapse of the bubble, would 
                                                 
12 While previous studies based on rational expectations such as GM (2005) reach a similar conclusion 
concerning domestic inflation targets, they do not consider adaptive learning interacting with policy rules 
that are second best.  We have already shown that policy conclusions based on rational expectations may 
not always carry over to the learning framework.  In fact, under learning, a domestic inflation target is not 
always preferred, but depends on the relative sizes of foreign shocks versus domestic shocks (see Chen and 
Kulthanavit 2008 for further details.)   6
have brought about more favorable economic outcomes more quickly.  This view is 
commonly justified by comparing BOJ’s actual policy with some variants of the 
benchmark Taylor rule that sets the interest rate response to CPI inflation gap (deviation 
from its target) to be 1.5, and the response to the output gap to be 0.5, while assuming a 2 
percent per annum real interest rate.  Following this approach, Bernanke and Gertler 
(1999), Jinushi et al. (2000), and McCallum (2000, 2003), for example, all conclude that 
BOJ’s policy was too tight during some sub-periods over the 1980s-1990s.
13   Figure 1 
shows that compared to the operational, or lagged data-based, version of the benchmark 
Taylor rule, BOJ’s actual rate was indeed high, especially between 1981 and 1989.
14    
During the aftermath of the bubble, many argue that the BOJ kept the interest rate 
high for too long, failing to properly accommodate the structural shift.  Jinushi et al. 
(2000) and Ito and Mishkin (2004), for instance, argue that the BOJ should have adopted 
the zero interest rate policy (ZIRP) much earlier than the official announcement in 
February 1999.
15  In March 2000, the BOJ temporarily abandoned the ZIRP and raised 
the call rate for a year, drawing widespread criticism.  Ito and Mishkin (2004), for 
example, call this interest rate hike “a clear policy mistake.”  Using a monetary-base rule 
instead to analyze Japanese monetary policy-setting, McCallum (2003) reaches a similar 
conclusion: BOJ’s policy had been too tight since the mid-1990s.
16    
A second debate in this literature concerns the merit of exchange rate stabilization.  
Several studies point out that in practice, the BOJ often engaged in exchange rate 
management, rather than focusing solely on output and inflation targeting.  According to 
McKinnon and Ohno (1997), for a decade since 1985, the BOJ systematically reacted to 
the Yen/Dollar real exchange rate by adjusting the instrument rate to counter yen 
                                                 
13 We note that these papers don't always agree on the exact periods over which the policy was too tight.  
Bernanke and Gertler (1999), for example, consider the policy to be too tight since 1992, but too lax over 
1987-89.  Generally, a tight or overly restrictive monetary policy refers to a case where the actual 
instrument rate is above the target rate suggested by the benchmark Taylor rule.   
14 We see that based on Japanese data, the mechanical benchmark Taylor rule may at times suggest an 
interest rate below the zero lower bound.  We do not address the practical and modeling difficulties 
associated with hitting the zero lower bound in this paper.  However, we consider alternative inflation 
targets and find the qualitative conclusions to be the same. 
15 Under ZIRP, the BOJ vowed to keep the call rate at zero until concern about deflation was dispelled. 
16 One difficulty in using the Taylor rule to evaluate monetary policy is choosing the appropriate measure 
of the output gap, which can affect the policy implications (see Ito and Mishkin 2004, Kuttner and Posen 
2004).  To avoid this problem, McCallum (2003) considers a monetary base rule that responds to deviations 
of nominal GDP growth from its target and the average rate of base velocity growth over the past four 
quarters.    7
appreciation and promote yen depreciation.  Similarly, Andrade and Divino (2005) and 
Jinushi et al. (2000) maintain that the BOJ was implicitly targeting exchange rate 
stability.
  Yu (2005) further attributes the high output volatility observed in Japan during 
the period 1993-2001 to an interest rate policy aimed at stabilizing the yen/dollar real 
exchange rate.  On the other hand, advocates in favor of exchange rate management point 
out that under zero nominal interest rate, the short-term nominal rate and monetary base 
are ineffective as policy instruments.  As such, purchasing unconventional assets such as 
long-term government bonds, foreign currencies, or even real estate may represent the 
only viable alternative.
17  In particular, purchasing foreign exchange may help depreciate 
the yen and stimulate aggregate demand via boosting net export.  While this is surely a 
“beggar-thy-neighbor” policy, McCallum (2003) counters that depreciating the yen 
would eventually raise Japanese income and lead to higher net imports.  McCallum thus 
proposes an exchange-rate targeting rule that depreciates the yen/dollar real exchange 
rate when either inflation or output falls below their target values. 
Much of the above debate is either conceptual in nature or relies mainly on partial 
equilibrium analyses in a rational expectation framework.  Our paper aims to examine 
these policy choices more systematically in a general equilibrium optimization 
framework that allows for explicit quantifications of welfare as well as learning behavior.   
 
3. The Open Economy Model and Monetary Policy Rules 
 
We take as our baseline the open economy rational expectations model from GM (2005), 
and discuss in Section 5 its calibration to the Japanese economy.  The model is a small 
open economy version of the Calvo (1983) sticky price model commonly used for closed 
economy monetary policy analyses, where the equilibrium dynamics are described by a 
new Keynesian Phillips curve and a forward-looking IS equation (see Clarida et al. 1999, 
for example.)  International asset markets are assumed to be complete, and purchasing 
power parity holds.  We close the dynamic system with alternative monetary policies, all 
expressed as lagged data-based Taylor rules.  As the focus of this paper is to study the 
dynamics of this model in a learning framework, below we present a brief sketch of the 
                                                 
17 The BOJ followed this strategy and raised its monthly purchase of long-term bonds from 400 billion yen 
to 1.2 trillion yen in several steps between August 2001 and October 2002.   8
basic model setup and the associated reduced-form dynamic equilibrium equations.  We 
refer interested readers to GM (2005) for more detailed derivations and discussions. 
 
3.1 The New Keynesian Open Economy Model 
 
Following GM (2005), our world consists of a continuum of identical small open 
economies uniformly distributed on the unit interval.   As preferences, production 
technology, and market structures are symmetric, below we present the optimization 
problems facing the representative household and firm from the perspective of one of 
these economies, indexed by H (Home).  We treat the rest of the world as a foreign block, 
with corresponding variables denoted by a subscript F.
18    
 
The Representative Household 
 
The home economy is inhabited by a representative household which at time 0, 
maximizes the following expected lifetime utility: 
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where  Ct and Nt are overall consumption and labor supplied.  β is the household’s 
discount factor, σ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and ϕ  is the inverse of labor 
supply elasticity.  Consumption index Ct is a CES composite of domestic and foreign 
goods (imports), defined by: 
    () () ()
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) 1 1
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where  η  > 0 measures the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign 
consumption baskets CH,t and CF,t.  Each of these baskets is in turn a CES aggregate of a 
continuum of differentiated goods, with elasticities of substitution between varieties 
given by ε > 1 and γ > 1 for the home and foreign indices respectively.
19  α  œ [0, 1] is 
                                                 
18 See GM (2005) for a more detailed discussion of this world setup and the exact modeling of the foreign 
block. 
19 To be more precise, γ is the substitutability between good baskets produced in different foreign countries. 
Each of these baskets, identical to the Home setup, is a CES aggregate of a variety of differentiated goods 
with an elasticity of substitution equal to ε.  See GM (2005).   9
the (exogenous) share of the domestic consumption allocated to imported goods; it can be 
interpreted as a measure of trade openness.   
The consumer faces the following sequence of period-by-period budget constraints: 
,, ,, , 1 1 ++ ⎡⎤ ++ ≤ + + ⎣⎦ H tH t F tF t t t t t t tt t PC PC EQ D D W N T   "t 
where PH,t and PF,t are the CES aggregated price indices of domestically-produced and 
imported goods respectively.   ,1 tt Q +  denotes the stochastic discount factor for one-period 
ahead nominal payoffs, and  1 t D +  is the nominal payoff in period t + 1 of the household’s 
portfolio at the end of period t.   t W  is the nominal wage, and  t T  is lump-sum 
transfers/taxes.  We assume complete asset markets. 
The consumer price index (CPI) at Home is given by: 
() () ()
1( 1 ) 11
,, 1 tH t F t PP P
η ηη
αα
− −− ⎡⎤ ≡− +
⎣⎦
 




On the production side, we assume a continuum of monopolistically competing firms 
each using a linear production technology which depends on the economy-wide 
stochastic labor productivity At: 
Yt ( j ) = At Nt  ( j ) 
where Y ( j ) and N ( j )are the output and employment of firm j respectively.  
Firms set prices in a staggered fashion à la Calvo (1983).  Parameter θ  denotes the 
fraction of firms that faces nominal rigidity each period, so at any time t, a fraction 1 -θ  
of randomly selected firms gets to set new prices optimally  to maximize expected 
discounted profits.   A typical firm j sets its new price  , H t P in period t to maximize the 
following: 
() { } ,, 0 ()
∞
++ + = ⎡ ⎤ − ⎣ ⎦ ∑
kn
t t tk tk H t tk k EQ Y j P M C θ  
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where 
n
t MC  is nominal marginal cost the firm faces, and CH,t(j) and CF,t(j) the total 
consumption of good j from home and abroad.
20  As is well known in the literature, this 
optimal price will involve a forward-looking term in addition to the standard 
monopolistic mark-up over contemporaneous marginal cost, reflecting the firm’s concern 
over the future dynamics of marginal costs up to the next price-changing opportunity.  
Using lower case letters to denote the logs of the respective variables, we obtain the 
following log-linear approximation for the optimal price:
21 
{} ,, , 0 log( ) log( ) (1 ) ( )
1
k





+ = == + − +




Goods-market clearing, together with log-linear approximations of the equilibrium 
aggregate demand equations around the appropriate steady states, imply a forward-
looking dynamic IS equation in the domestic output gap and inflation: 
() 1, 1
1




++ =− − −     (1). 
The output gap variable, xt , is defined as the deviation of log domestic output from its 
equilibrium level in the absence of any nominal rigidities (the flexible-price level).   
Parameter sα is a function of the degree of openness and the substitutability between 
domestic and foreign goods; it captures the sensitivity of home output to terms-of-trade 
fluctuations.
22  The home interest rate, rt, is the monetary policy instrument set by the 
Central Bank.   ,, , 1 H tH t H t pp π − =−  is domestic producer price (DPP) inflation, with  , H t p  
being the (log) domestic price index.  The last term, t rr , is the domestic natural interest 
rate and one of the three stochastic driving variables in our dynamic system.  It depends 
                                                 
20 Since all firms are symmetric, they use the same optimal price-setting rule.  We can thus drop the firm-
specific index j. 
21 The log-linear approximation is taken around the zero-inflation, balanced-trade steady state. 
22 Expressed in terms of the structural parameters defined earlier, 
() ( ) [] /1 1 1 ≡− + + − −
α σσ α α σ γ α σ η .   11
on the degree of openness, the expected world output growth Et
*
1 t y + Δ , and the domestic 
labor productivity shock at, which we assume to follow a stationary AR(1) process.
23  
On the supply side, we assume the presence of an employment subsidy that leaves the 
monetary policy authority with the sole task of correcting the distortion from price 
rigidity.  Under this assumption, the optimal monetary policy is one that replicates the 
flexible price equilibrium resource allocation.
24  Aggregating firms’ optimal pricing 
condition above and relating their real marginal cost to the output gap, we can express the 
domestic inflation dynamics by the New-Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) below: 
,, 1 + =+ + H tt t H t t x Eu α πκ β π      ( 2 )    
where  α κ depends on the degree of openness and how employment and the terms of trade 
respond to domestic output shifts.
25  We further assume that DPP inflation is affected by 
a stochastic cost push shock, ut, which captures determinants of marginal costs that do 
not move proportionally with the output gap.  ut is the source of nominal disturbance in 
our dynamic system.
26   
Equations (1) and (2) above are the by-now standard reduced-form equations that 
describe the structural economy in terms of output gap and DPP inflation.  In order to 
model Taylor rules that stabilize CPI inflation, we next relate CPI inflation, πt, to DPP 
inflation, πH,t, and rewrite equations (1) and (2) in terms of CPI inflation.  To do so, we 
note that under purchasing power parity (PPP), the relationship between πt and πH,t is 
given by: 
    , tH t t s ππ α =+ Δ       ( 3 )  
where  ,, tF t H t sp p ≡− is the (log) effective terms of trade for the home country;  , Ft p  is 
the (log) price index for imported goods, expressed in domestic currency.   To describe 
the dynamics of the terms of trade, st, we note that under the assumption of complete 
                                                 
23 See GM (2005) and Appendix A for more details. 
24 The assumption of an output or employment subsidy that offsets the distortion from the monopolistically 
competitive price/wage-setters’ market power has been widely used since Rotemberg and Woodford 
(1999).   See Woodford (2003) and Section 3.2 for further discussions. 
25 Expressed in terms of the structural parameters,  (1) ( 1 ) ( ) /
αα κβ θ θ σ ϕ θ ≡− − +  
26 We note that when this small open economy is in perfect autarky (α = 0), the dynamic equations (1) and 
(2) are identical to the dynamic IS and NKPC equations, respectively, in a standard closed economy setup.  
See, for example, Clarida et al. (1999) and Woodford (2003).   12
international asset markets, the expected depreciation of the home currency reflects 
international interest rate differentials according to the uncovered interest parity (UIP) 
condition:  
    []
*
1 + Δ= − tt t t Ee r r       ( 4 )  
where  t e  is the (log) nominal effective exchange rate and 
*
t r  the world interest rate.  
Assuming that the law of one price holds for each product,
*
, Ft t t p ep =+ where 
*
t p  is the 
log  world price index, we can relate terms-of-trade changes to home currency 
depreciation, home deflation, and the aggregate inflation in the world market as follows: 
*
, tt t H t se ππ Δ= Δ+ −       ( 5 )  
where 
** *
1 tt t p p π − =−  is world inflation.  Combining (5) with the UIP condition (4), we 
obtain: 
    () ( )
**
1, 1 1 tt t t t H t tt t sE s r E rE ππ +++ =− − + −    (6). 
From the perspective of the home economy, world interest rates and expected 
inflation are exogenous, so we define  ()
**
1 ttt t rE υπ + =−  as the third/foreign shock that 
drives our dynamic system.    
Using equation (3), we can express equations (1), (2), and (6) in terms of the CPI 
inflation. The open economy IS, NKPC, and terms-of-trade dynamics can then be 
expressed by the following three stochastic difference equations:     
   () 11 1
11 1




++ + =−−− − +  (7), 
() 11 1 1 t t t t t t ttt E xE s s s u α πβ π κ α β α β α ++ − =+ − + + − +  (8), 
() 11
11
(1 ) (1 )
tt t t t t t sE s r E πυ
αα
++ =− − +
−−
    (9). 
 
Monetary Policy Rules 
 
To close the model, we assume the policymaker is able to commit to following policy 
rules in the form of an operational Taylor (1993) rule, which sets the domestic interest   13
rate  t r  in response to observable lagged data.   While the literature offers extensive 
discussions on the stability and learnability of equilibria under various forms of Taylor 
rules, we follow McCallum and Nelson (1999, 2004) in pointing out that it may be 
unrealistic to assume policymakers can condition policy on current/contemporaneous 
variables or on accurate private expectations.  As our focus is to assess the likely 
quantitative importance of the learning process, we restrict our analyses to the set of 
equilibria that is determinate and stable under learning.
27      
The first rule we consider is a CPI-inflation-based Taylor rule.  Under this policy rule, 
the policymaker sets the interest rate  t r  in response to deviations of lagged CPI inflation 
and the output gap from their target levels: 
11 ()
TT
tt x t rx π ρπ ϕπ π ϕ −− =+ + − +       (10) 
where 
T π  is the targeted CPI inflation.  Parameters  π ϕ  and  x ϕ  > 0 capture how 
aggressive the policymaker is in response to deviations of CPI inflation and the output 
gap from their target values: 
T π  and zero, respectively.  The time discount rate 
1 1 ρβ
− =−  can be interpreted as the riskless return in the steady state.  Note that reacting 
to CPI inflation implies that the policymaker reacts to the terms of trade. 
We consider next a managed exchange rate (ER) policy rule where the policymaker 
engages in exchange rate stabilization, instead of focusing solely on output and inflation 
targeting.  This rule takes the form: 
11 1 ()
TT
tt x t s t rx s π ρπ ϕπ π ϕ ϕ −− − =+ + − + +    (11) 
where  s ϕ  > 0 measures the sensitivity of the policy to movements in the terms of trade. 
                                                 
27 Howitt (1992) and Bullard and Mitra (2002), among others, point out that in the learning framework, 
convergence to a determinate rational expectations equilibrium (REE) should not be taken for granted, as it 
is not clear whether or how agents can coordinate on that equilibrium.  Monetary policy rules should thus 
pay attention to delivering a determinate REE which is learnable.  Bullard and Mitra (2002) find that rules 
obeying the “Taylor principle” based on current expectations can assure learnable equilibria.  They also 
find that rules that respond to lagged values of inflation and output deviations may not generate 
determinancy, and the determinate REE are not necessarily learnable.  For a more detailed discussion on 
the conditions for determinacy and stability under learning for different classes of monetary policy, see 
Bullard and Mitra (2002, 2007), EH (2003a, 2003b, 2006) and Waters (2007).  Llosa and Tuesta (2008) and 
Bullard and Schaling (2006) provide similar analyses for the open economy setup.   14
The last policy rule we consider is a Domestic Focus Taylor rule, under which the 





tH H t H x t rx π ρπ ϕ π π ϕ −− =+ + − +      (12) 
where 
T
H π  is a targeted DPP inflation, and  0
H π ϕ >  measures how aggressive the 
policymaker is in reacting to any deviations of DPP  inflation from its target, 
T
H π . 
  
3.2 Welfare Calculation 
 
Before evaluating alternative monetary policy, one needs to specify what other policy 
instruments, if any, are available to the social planner, thereby pinning down the specific 
distortions monetary policy aims to address.   While it may not always lead to the 
globally welfare maximizing outcome, it is customary in the literature to assume the 
presence of an employment subsidy that eliminates relevant economic distortions and 
renders the flexible price equilibrium allocation optimal.
28    In the rational expectation 
framework, the sole objective of monetary policy, or the optimal policy, is then to correct 
the distortion caused by price rigidities and to replicate the flexible price equilibrium.  
The advantage of this assumption is that the undistorted, flexible price steady-state 
production and employment levels provide computational convenience for approximating 
the representative household’s welfare under various policies, as first discussed in 
Rotemberg and Woodford (1999).  
In this paper, we compare the welfare outcome of four alternative Taylor rules, none 
of which is necessarily equivalent to the welfare-maximizing policy discussed above.
29   
We motivate the choice of these sub-optimal interest rate rules by actual policy debates 
                                                 
28 In the close economy, this outcome is achieved by a subsidy that exactly neutralizes the distortion caused 
by the market power of the monopolistically-competing firms.  In the open economy setting, additional 
subsidy is required to eliminate the incentive for the monetary authority to engage in “beggar-thy-
neighbor” policies, i.e. manipulate the terms of trade (See Benigno and Benigno 2003, for example.)  Gali 
(2003) and GM (2005) show that under certain parameter restrictions, this level of subsidy can be derived 
analytically. 
29 In the monetary policy literature, a specific targeting rule is where policymakers set interest rate via a 
feedback rule to meet the optimal targeting condition.  On the other hand, the Taylor rule belongs to the 
class of instrument rules, which are considered suboptimal as the rate is set to respond to macroeconomic 
variables without explicitly optimizing any policy objective function.  See Svensson (2003b) and 
McCallum and Nelson (2004b) for a survey on a targeting rule vs. an instrument rule.   15
and practical implementation considerations discussed earlier.  For each rule, the 
representative household’s expected utility can be approximated locally around the 
flexible price steady state using a second-order Taylor expansion, which gives us a 
measure of the utility loss relative to the optimal policy.   Measured as fractions of the 
steady-state consumption level, we express the expected welfare loss associated with a 
policy rule as the weighted sum of the variance of DPP inflation and the variance of the 
output gap, as shown below: 
,
(1 )






− ⎡⎤ =− + + ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
  (13) 
where  λ is defined as (1 )(1 ) / βθθ θ −− .
30  We use equation (13) to evaluate the 
performances of alternative monetary policy rules in Section 5. 
 
4. Models of Expectation Formation 
 
While the assumption of rational expectations has become the standard methodology for 
studying macroeconomic dynamics, it should not be taken for granted.  As discussed in 
EH (2001), amongst others, expectations can be out of equilibrium, at least in the short 
run, as a result of exogenous events such as structural shifts.  Given Japan’s experiences 
over the past decades, we believe this is a relevant element to incorporate into our DSGE 
model.  The normative implication of this off-equilibrium assumption is that monetary 
policy may help minimize the instabilities that can arise from agents’ expectation errors 
and learning behavior.   Below we present the expectation-formation processes under 
rational expectations and adaptive learning.  We also give a brief conceptual 
interpretation of the adaptive learning process. 
 
4.1 Rational Expectations 
 
Rational expectations (RE) can be viewed as the equilibrium or convergence between 
stochastic macroeconomic dynamics and economic agents’ forecasts of them.  RE is 
defined as the mathematical conditional expectation of the particular variable, and it 
assumes the optimal/efficient use as well as the availability of all relevant current 
                                                 
30 See GM (2005).   16
information, such as the true structure of the economy, the stochastic process governing 
exogenous shocks, and/or the policy formation process.   Under RE, economic agents, 
having perfect knowledge about the structure of the economy, know the rational 
expectations equilibrium (REE) of the economy. 
In the context of our model described above, we solve for the REE of the dynamical 
system given by equations (7), (8) and (9), together with a monetary policy rule, Eq. (10) 
or (11).
31   The reduced-form system can be expressed as the following: 
11 CD tt t t t y Ey y w +− =Α+Β + +       (14) 
1 tw t t ww ρ ε − =+       ( 1 5 )  
where  []   ,,   t tt t yx s π ′ = is a vector of the three endogenous variables,  t w = 
[] , ,  ttt rr u υ ′the exogenous variables, which we assume to follow a stationary vector 
autoregressive process, and  ,,, , ,  tr r t u t t υ εεε ε ′ ⎡ ⎤ = ⎣ ⎦ is a vector of white noise.  A, B, C, and 
D are vector and matrices of coefficients.  Following McCallum (1983, 1998), we solve 
for the REE by focusing on the Minimum State Variable (MSV) solutions to the system, 
which are linear functions of the following form: 
   1 tt t y ab y c w − =+ +       ( 1 6 )  
where matrices a ,b  and c can be solved by the method of undetermined coefficients.
32   
To summarize, under the RE assumption, agents know the correct form of the REE, 
Eq.(16), and its relevant parameters (a ,b  and c .)  Agents make use of this knowledge 




Structural changes, new policy regimes, and other unexpected shifts in the economy may 
all disturb the REE discussed above.    In order to capture such off-equilibrium dynamics, 
we incorporate into the open economy model the adaptive learning process proposed by 
                                                 
31 Under the DPP targeting rule, we complement the system given by (1), (2) and (6) with policy rule (12). 
32 The MSV solutions are generally considered equilibria that are free of bubble and sunspot components.  
A system may be indeterminate with multiple stationary REE, but we restrict our analyses to systems with 
a unique stationary solution, which is the MSV solution.  See McCallum (1983, 1998).   17
EH (2001) and Orphanides and Williams (hereafter OW, 2005).  In contrast to RE, the 
learning framework assumes that optimizing agents are bounded rational and do not have 
perfect information about the dynamic equations governing the evolution of the economy 
(such as the values of a ,b  and c in Eq. 16.)  At each time t, agents rely on observable 
data and an adaptive learning algorithm to obtain the relevant parameter estimates, and 
form expectations accordingly.  As new data become available, they revise their estimates 
so forecast errors are corrected gradually over time.  Under certain conditions, the REE is 
a fixed point of the learning dynamics and the economy eventually converges to it; 
however, this may not happen as discussed at length in EH (2001), among others.
33      
We consider two types of learning algorithms commonly used in the literature: least 
squares learning and constant gain learning.  In least squares learning, agents use all 
available past data and a least squares regression to deduce the parameters of interest.   
As a conceptual comparison, it can be viewed as a decreasing gain learning in that as 
time goes by, the relative importance of newly arrived information diminishes in shaping 
agents’ estimates and forecasts.  Under constant gain learning, on the other hand, agents 
update their expectations over time by looking at a fixed-width but rolling window of 
past data, so new information is always incorporated into their forecasts with equal 
weights.
34  Conventionally, a smaller gain means that agents use longer series of lagged 
data to form their forecasts.  In our setup, the gain constant, g, indicates that agents look 
at 2/g lags of data at each time.  So for g = 0.02, a common calibration used in the 
literature, agents form their forecasts using 25 years of historical data (100 quarters.)    
An advantage of the constant gain setup is that by varying g, one can capture the 
degree of rationality.  A smaller gain may represent a higher degree of rationality, as it 
more closely resembles least squares learning, which eventually converges to REE.  In 
addition, as discussed in Waters (2007), agents may choose a smaller gain when they 
expect more stability in the economy, such as when they expect the policymaker to be 
credible and adhere to the announced rules.  In such instances, they do not put as much 
                                                 
33 The economy may or may not converge to the REE asymptotically.  When it does, the REE is considered 
to be “stable under learning” (see EH 2001, 2003a, 2003b, 2006, and Bullard and Mitra 2002).  In this 
paper, we focus on cases where we have stability under least squares learning.  With constant gain learning, 
the economy does not converge to the REE, and the learning is “perpetual.” 
34 OW (2005) considers constant gain learning to be more appropriate in situations where agents remain 
alert to any potential structural change in the economy.   18
weight on the most recent news, but rather rely on a longer range of data to learn about 
the structural parameters.   
The fundamental idea of adaptive learning is that at each period t, private agents have 
in mind a Perceived Law of Motion (PLM) for the economy, which has the same 
functional form as the rational expectations MSV solutions described in Eq. (16).  The 
exogenous shocks,  t w , as well as lagged data yt-1 are observed by all, but agents do not 
know the true parameter values a ,b  and c associated with the MSV REE.  Instead, at 
each time t, they use past data and a learning algorithm (described below) to obtain 
parameter estimates at, bt, and ct.  They perceive the economy to evolve according to the 
following law of motion (PLM),  
1 tt t t t t y ab y c w − =+ +       ( 1 7 ) .  
To form their forecasts for t + 1, they use the PLM along with the observed  t w as 
follows:  
11 tt t ttt ttt Ey a bEy cEw ++ =+ + ,   or 
() ( )
2
11 tt t t t t t t tw t Ey I b a by bc c w ρ +− =+ + + +    (18) 
where the VAR process for the exogenous shocks, or  w ρ , is also known to all agents.   
At the same time t, the policymaker sets interest rate  t r  based on the chosen policy 
rule.  The resulting outcome of the economy, the Actual Law of Motion (ALM) for t y , is 
generated according to equations (14) and (18), and can be expressed as the following:
 35  
() ( )
2
11 CD t t tt t t tt w t t t y Ib ab y b cc w y w −− ⎡⎤ =Α+Β + + + + + + ⎣⎦ ρ  , or 
()() ()
2
1 CD tt t t t t t t w t y Ib a b y b cc w ρ − =Α+ Β + +Β + +Β + + ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦  (19).
  
This process then repeats itself at the next period, t + 1: agents incorporate newly 
available information, the actual yt to re-estimate the PLM equation and obtain new 
parameter estimates at+1, bt+1 and ct+1.  Together with the observed shocks  1 t w + , they form 
their forecasts for the next period.  The actual yt+1, or the ALM for  1 t y +  is generated 
                                                 
35 The ALM is thus the true data generating process, and sometimes called the temporary equilibrium for 
the endogenous variables (see EH 2006).    19
together with the interest rate rt+1 set by the policymaker.  The learning process continues 
in this rolling fashion.    
The recursive learning algorithms agents use to update their estimates is given by the 
following equations: 
    ()
1
11 1 1 1 tt t t t t t t gR z y z φφ φ
−
−− − − −
′ ′ =+ −     (20) 
    () 11 1 1 ' tt t t t t RR g z z R −− − −
′ =+ −      ( 2 1 )  
where  [] , ,  tt t t abc φ ′ =  and  [] 1 1,  ,   tt t zy w −
′ = .  Rt is the updated matrix of second 
moments of the regressors zt.  The gain parameter, gt, plays an important role in 
characterizing the two types of adaptive learning we consider.  Under least squares 
learning, gt = 1/t, and the updating equations (20) and (21) are equivalent to running 
recursive least squares regressions using all lags.  On the other hand, when the gain 
parameter is a small constant, 0 < gt  < 1, we are in the framework of constant gain 
learning.  In our simulations, we consider gain values 0.01, 0.02, and 0.03, to be 
consistent with the range suggested in recent literature.
36 
To summarize, under adaptive learning, the dynamics of the model are defined by the 
recursive updating equations (20) and (21), the expectation-formation equation (18) 
derived from the PLM, the reduced-form equation (14) which captures the structure of 
the economy and the policy rule, and the AR(1) process of stochastic shocks wt (15). 
 
5. Numerical Analyses and Discussion 
5.1 Calibration 
 
As the baseline for our calibration, we adopt most of the structural and preference 
parameter values for our model from GM (2005), as we list in Table 2.   In addition, the 
openness parameter α  is set be 0.11, which corresponds to the average share of Japanese 
imports over GDP during the period 1983:Q1-2005:Q2.  We follow Ball (1999) and 
Nunes (2004) and set the discount factorβ  to be unity, which makes the zero steady-state 
output gap assumed consistent with positive steady-state inflation.  The three driving 
                                                 
36 OW (2005, 2007a, b) and Branch and Evans (2006), for example, suggest gain values in the range of 0.01 
to 0.05.    20
shocks to our dynamic system, { } , ,  ttt rr u υ , are assumed to follow independent AR(1) 
processes; we discuss their calibrations in more details in Appendix A.   
For the monetary policy rules, we set  π ϕ  = 1.5 and  x ϕ  = 0.5 for our benchmark rule, 
as suggested in Taylor (1993).
37  The target CPI inflation, 
T π , is set to be 0.822 percent, 
the average of CPI inflation in Japan during the period 1983:Q1-2005:Q2.
38  For the rule 
with a tighter inflation control, we set  π ϕ  to be 2.  To capture exchange rate (ER) 
management behavior, we let the policymaker react to the terms of trade with  s ϕ  = 0.2.  
Finally, for the domestically focus policy rule, parameters 
H π ϕ  and 
T
H π  are set to be 1.5 
and 0.822, respectively, as in the Benchmark, in order to isolate the effect of the different 
price index.  Below is a summary of the four monetary policy rules we evaluate: 
Rule 1:   11 1.5( ) 0.5
TT
tt t rx ππ π −− =+ − +  (Benchmark)   
Rule 2:   11 2( ) 0.5
TT
tt t rx ππ π −− =+ − +    (Tight Inflation Control) 
Rule 3:   11 1 1.5( ) 0.5 0.2
TT
tt t t rx s ππ π −− − =+ − + +  (Managed  ER)   
Rule 4:   ,1 1 1.5( ) 0.5
TT
tH H t H t rx ππ π −− =+ − +  (Domestic  Focus). 
 
5.2 Simulation Results and Discussion 
 
For our simulation exercises, we implement the learning algorithm in EH (2001, 2006), 
and further incorporate a “projection facility” to constrain simulation paths to be non-
explosive.  We provide more detailed descriptions in Appendix B.
39  For each scenario, 
the dynamics of the economy is simulated 200 times for 250 periods each, with the first 
50 periods discarded to reduce the initial condition effects.  We evaluate the performance 
of the policy rules based on the variances of the generated output gap and DPP inflation, 
from which we compute the welfare losses using Eq. (13).   
                                                 
37 Recall that this is also the benchmark policy rule commonly used in prior literature to evaluate whether 
BOJ’s policy was overly restrictive. 
38 Here we do not presume that Japan’s actual policy target was indeed 0.822% or even constant over the 
last two decades, yet our robustness checks of alternative targets (0 and 2%) suggest that the qualitative 
conclusions of our analyses are robust to the exact policy targets assumed. 
39 The “projection facility” is commonly employed in the learning literature to rule out explosive equilibria 
(see Gaspar et al. 2006, OW 2007a, and Waters 2007, for example).   It tends to induce higher standard 
deviations across simulation results, however.   21
Tables 3 and 4 report the variances of the output gap and DPP inflation under the four 
monetary policy rules.  The second and third columns in each table show the results 
under rational expectations and least squares learning, respectively. The fourth through 
sixth columns report the outcomes under constant gain learning, using gain values 0.01, 
0.02, and 0.03.   All numbers reported are averages across simulation runs, and the 
standard errors across runs are reported in the parentheses.  Table 5 combines the above 
two statistics and reports the overall welfare results of these policy rules; the reported 
numbers indicate percent deviations from the steady-state consumption under the optimal 
policy.
40  
We want to emphasize the following observations.
41  First, given a policy rule, the 
learning process invariably induces additional volatility in both the output gap and DPP 
inflation, compared to those obtained under RE.
42   This is in general consistent with 
findings in the closed-economy learning literature, such as in Gaspar et al. (2006) and 
OW (2007b), although the latter reports much less pronounced differences in the 
variances of the output gap.  Intuitively, imperfect knowledge and the learning 
mechanism imply expectation errors, which can propagate along with structural shocks, 
raising the overall volatility of macroeconomic variables.  In an open economy, agents 
have to learn an additional process that governs the dynamics of the terms of trade (Eq. 
6), which may in turn accentuate the effect of learning on output gap variability.   These 
findings support the view that deviations from RE, possibly triggered by structural 
changes in the economy, may be the culprit for observed high volatility.
43  
Next, we see that high output volatility may indeed be the result of bad policy choices 
or “mistakes”, as discussed earlier.  Table 3 shows that, relative to the benchmark Taylor 
rule, tight inflation control or explicit exchange rate stabilization both lead to higher 
output volatility, regardless of how private agents form their expectations.  Somewhat 
                                                 
40 We do not report the welfare losses associated with the Managed ER policy rule because it is obvious 
from Tables 1.3 and 1.4 that this policy creates significant welfare losses. 
41 We find qualitatively similar results as discussed below in our various robustness checks, including one 
where we assume the cost push shock to be i.i.d, as suggested in Svensson (2000).   
42 We note the exception with the Managed ER rule, which generates significantly higher volatility than 
other rules and the variances are not really distinguishable under learning vs. rational expectations. 
43 We observe in Tables 1.3-1.5 that as the gain constant increases (corresponding to learning using a 
smaller window of data), the resulting volatility or welfare loss tend to decline. This may be explained by 
the fact that higher-gain learning puts more weight on the newest information while discarding old data, 
which arguably are farther from the eventual steady state path.   22
strikingly, the Managed Exchange Rate policy rule induces drastically higher volatilities 
in both the output gap and DPP inflation.  The additional interest rate response to the 
terms-of-trade beyond the weight (α) implicit in the CPI target appears to amplify output 
volatility approximately ten-fold.  On the other side, the domestically-focused policy rule, 
which removes from the benchmark CPI rule its interest rate reaction to the terms of 
trade, generates significantly lower output volatility – a roughly ten-fold reduction as 
well (Table 3).   The Domestic Focus rule appears to significantly outperform other 
terms-of-trade dependent rules in stabilizing output and inflation at home, as we discuss 
further below. 
High output volatility does not by itself imply high welfare loss; Table 4 reports the 
variances of DPP inflation under the same four policy rules.  Contrary to the results for 
the output gap, here we see that the expectation-formation process does matters: while a 
tighter inflation control relative to the benchmark raises inflation volatility under RE, it 
lowers inflation volatility under adaptive learning.   In other words, imperfect knowledge 
affects how the inflation dynamics interact with monetary policy, as discussed in Gaspar 
et al. (2006)  and OW (2006, 2007a, b) in a closed-economy setting.  OW (2005), for 
example, points out that strengthening the policy response to inflation helps limit the 
increase in the perceived inflation persistence under learning, and through this channel, 
tight inflation control may reduce the volatility in both inflation and the output gap.   The 
welfare implication of this result is presented in Table 5.  We see that under RE, the 
benchmark Taylor rule commonly used in the literature is indeed preferable to more 
aggressive inflation control.  However, in situations where knowledge is imperfect, it is 
no longer appropriate to continue evaluating policies against this benchmark, as the 
policy with a heavier emphasis on inflation control actually dominates this benchmark 
rule.  Even though tighter inflation control raises output volatility, it helps agents learn 
the inflation dynamics better, thus reducing the overall welfare loss.
44  We note, in 
addition, that the welfare losses associated with the benchmark and the tight inflation 
control rule are smaller when agents use a shorter range of data (higher gain constant) to 
learn about the economy.  In these two cases, the learning process and its associated 
                                                 
44 In our calibration, the relative weight on inflation stabilization relative to output stabilization in the 
welfare loss function (Eq. 13) is roughly 18 to 1.   23
forecast errors induce excess volatility.  Using a shorter window of past data to update the 
forecast functions allows agents to fix forecast errors more quickly; that is, old mistakes 
are forgotten more quickly.  This can help reduce volatility and improve welfare.     
In terms of exchange rate management, we note that regardless of the expectation-
formation process, explicit exchange rate stabilization results in extremely poor 
performance, characterized by drastically higher volatilities and welfare costs.  As CPI 
inflation incorporates terms-of-trade movements already ( , tH t t s ππ α =+ Δ ), additional 
interest rate responses appear to be an overreaction, inducing high fluctuations in the 
economy.  This finding, together with the observation that the Domestic Focus policy 
rule outperforms all the other policy rules in Tables 3-5, raises the obvious question of 
whether all reactions to the terms of trade are overreactions.  In other words, is the 
Domestic Focus policy rule always preferred?
45   
Tables 6 and 7 help shed light on the question of whether or when policymakers may 
want to put a stronger emphasis on the domestic variables as their policy targets.  Rather 
than subjecting our model to all three exogenous shocks (aggregate demand, cost push, 
and terms-of-trade), we show in Table 6 the welfare outcome when the economy faces 
only one shock at a time.  Isolating the impact of different structural shocks, it becomes 
obvious that the large stabilization advantage of the Domestic Focus rule comes through 
chiefly in the presence of the foreign/terms-of-trade shock, as illustrated in the last panel 
of Table 6.  This advantage is so large that it easily overwhelms any differences in the 
three rules’ relative performances under the other two shocks, which explains our 
previous finding that the Domestic Focus policy consistently outperforms the other rules.  
Table 7 emphasizes the importance of the foreign shock in choosing between a CPI- vs. 
DPP- inflation target.   Here we dampen the variance of the white noise term in the 
foreign shocks by a factor of five (from 0.005 to 0.001), and compare the welfare losses 
under various policy rules.  We see that the Domestic Focus rule now performs poorly 
compared to the CPI inflation targeting rules under adaptive learning.  These results 
suggest that in an open economy subject to volatile foreign shocks, policymakers should 
                                                 
45 There is a large body of literature comparing the desirability of DPP vs. CPI targeting.  They mostly 
focus on a rational expectations setting.  Chen and Kulthanavit (2008) explore this issue in an open-
economy adaptive learning framework, and find the preferred policy depends on the extent of knowledge 
imperfection.   24
place more weight on stabilizing domestic prices.  However, unlike policy conclusions 





With explicit micro-foundations, our general equilibrium model provides a framework to 
systematically evaluate the different policy views concerning Japan’s monetary policy 
stance since the 1980s.  We also explore whether the observed output volatility may in 
part be caused by deviations from rational expectations, a likely scenario given the 
structural shifts in the Japanese economy over the last decades.   We thus incorporate into 
our open economy model an adaptive learning algorithm, with the additional goal of 
analyzing whether the expectation-formation process may affect the preferred policy 
choice.   We compare four operational Taylor rules under rational expectations and 
adaptive learning, and evaluate their welfare consequences using a second order 
approximation of the representative consumer’s utility function. 
We find that first of all, imperfect knowledge and the associated learning process 
raise output and inflation volatility.  Next, even though tight inflation control relative to 
the standard Taylor rule can lead to excess output fluctuations, it can help dampen 
harmful inflation feedback in a learning framework, and lower overall inflation volatility.  
As such, the preferred policy in periods of economic uncertainty – when deviations from 
rational expectations are more likely – may deviate from the standard Taylor rule and put 
more weight on stabilizing inflation.   A policy rule that would “too tight” under rational 
expectation may be appropriate under learning.  We also find that explicit terms-of-trade 
or exchange rate targeting incurs substantial welfare costs.  Finally, when an economy 
faces persistent volatile foreign shocks, the policy rule should target domestic producer 
price inflation instead of CPI inflation.   25
Appendix A: Calibration of the Exogenous Shocks 
 
There are three stochastic driving forces { } , ,  ttt rr u υ  in our model, representing 
exogenous aggregate demand shifts, changes in the foreign expected real interest rate, 
and the cost-push shocks respectively.  We calibrate their stochastic properties as 
follows: 
The natural real interest rates, 
1








, is a function of  t a , the 
log labor productivity, measured as deviations from trend.  We calibrate it by fitting an 
AR(1) process to the Japanese labor productivity data obtained from Source OECD.  We 
obtain the following process for  t rr : 
1, 0.66 tt r r t rr rr ε − =+ , with 
, rr t ε σ  = 0.0029. 
For the foreign real interest rate shock  t υ , we follow the methodology proposed by 
Monacelli (2004) and fit an AR(1) process to the US real interest rate.  The stochastic 
process for  t υ is then: 
     1, 0.97 tt t υ υυ ε − =+ , with 
, ut ε σ  = 0.005. 
Finally, we assume that the domestic cost push shocks  t u follows an AR (1) 
process in the following form: 
   1, 0.4 tt u t uu ε − =+ ,   with 
,t υ ε σ  = 0.001. 
As discussed in the text, we follow Svensson (2000) and consider the case where the cost 
push shocks are i.i.d. white noise as a robustness check for this assumption.  We do not 
report the results as they support the qualitative results presented in this paper. 
 
Appendix B: The Implementation of the Learning Algorithms 
 
As initial conditions for each adaptive learning simulation, we perturb the rational 
expectations equilibrium with a small white noise as follows:   0.005 random aa =+ × , 
0.04 random bb =+ × ,  0.02 random cc =+ × , where “random” is drawn from a uniform 
distribution.  We set  0 y y = and  0 R R = .   26
In the least squares simulations, we mitigate the initial volatility of the parameter 
estimates by using a small constant gain for the first 20 periods.  That is, gt = 1/N for t = 
1, 2, …, N and gt = 1/t for t > N, with N = 20.  The innovations in each period are drawn 
from normal distributions. 
In addition, to keep the stochastic simulation non-explosive, we implement two 
additional algorithms suggested by OW (2007a) to reflect the view that in practice, 
private agents would reject unstable models so our analyses should similarly rule them 
out.   In each period, we compute the roots of the modulus of the forecasting VAR, 
excluding the constants.  If all of the roots are in the modulus of 1, the forecast model is 
updated as discussed in the text.  If not, the forecast model is not updated and the 
matrices φ  and R are kept at their respective values from the previous period.  We further 
impose the following condition to restrain explosive behavior: if any of the relevant 
variables exceeds, in absolute value, five times its unconditional standard deviations 
(computed under the assumption of rational expectations), then the variable that exceeds 
this bound is set to the boundary value for that period.   
These two constraints are not sufficient to rule out all explosive behavior in our 
adaptive learning simulations. Thus, we compute relevant statistics using only simulation 
runs that give variable variances that are less than ten times their respective variances 
under rational expectations.  For the last scenario (Domestic Focus policy with foreign 
shocks) in Table 6, we impose 10
20 instead of ten as the cut-off, since there is little 
variation in the rational expectations outcomes. 
   27
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* The benchmark operational Taylor rule takes the following form: 
**
11 1.5( ) 0.5
−− =++ − +
tt t t rr r x ππ π , 
where rt is the call rate; rrt is the natural real rate (set to be 2 percent); πt-1 is the one-period lagged CPI 
inflation rate, and xt-1 is the one-period lagged output gap.  π
* is the target CPI inflation, which is assumed 
to be 2 percent.    
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Table 1: Standard Deviations of the Real GDP Growth Rate for the Major OECD Countries  
 
 
   




Table 2: Parameter Values for Numerical Analysis 
 
       
σ   γ   η θ   ϕ β   α  
1 1 1  0.75  3 1  0.11 
 
  Source: Gali and Monacelli (2005) and authors’ calculations (see main text). 
Country  Standard deviation of RGDP growth rate 






United Kingdom  1.70 
United States  1.19   32







Constant Gain Leaning 






















































Note: Numbers reported are the averaged variances of the output gap, multiplied by 100, over the 200 
simulation runs.  The numbers in parentheses are the standard errors of statistics.  We omit results that do 
not satisfy the projection facility conditions, as discussed in Appendix B. 
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Note: Numbers reported are the averaged variances of the Domestic Producer Price Inflation, multiplied by 
100, over the 200 simulation runs.  The numbers in parentheses are the standard errors of statistics.  We 
omit results that do not satisfy the projection facility conditions, as discussed in Appendix B. 
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Note: Numbers reported are the averaged expected welfare loss computed from Equation (13), multiplied 
by 100, over 200 simulations.  The welfare loss is measured as percent deviation from optimal steady state 
consumption.  The numbers in parentheses are the standard errors of statistics.  We omit results that do not 
satisfy the projection facility conditions, as discussed in Appendix B. 
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Note: Numbers reported are the averaged expected welfare loss computed from Equation (13), multiplied 
by 100, over 200 simulations.  The welfare loss is measured as percent deviation from optimal steady state 
consumption.  The numbers in parentheses are the standard errors of statistics.  We omit results that do not 
satisfy the projection facility conditions, as discussed in Appendix B. 
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Table 7: Welfare Loss under Alternative Policy Rule:   1, 0.97 tt t υ υυ ε − =+  with the standard deviation of 







Constant Gain Leaning 









































Note: Numbers reported are the averaged expected welfare loss computed from Equation (13), multiplied 
by 100, over 200 simulations.  The welfare loss is measured as percent deviation from optimal steady state 
consumption.  The numbers in parentheses are the standard errors of statistics.  We omit results that do not 
satisfy the projection facility conditions, as discussed in Appendix B. 
 
 